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Preface and Acknowledgments
Historical inquiry is often predicated on deceptively simple questions, 
one of which is “Why did people do that?” Answers are typically for-
mulated around a combination of internal motivations and external 
factors: prevailing socioeconomic conditions, calculations of personal 
or political advantage, national security requirements, ethnic loyalties, 
or other cultural norms. The question of the objective sought becomes 
more urgent when the action taken appears, at least to the contempo-
rary observer, hard to justify. Thus we tend to be more engaged by the 
actions of history’s wrongdoers than by those of the well intentioned, 
who remain, for many, historically dull. Does the work of European co-
lonialists fall into that category of historical wrongdoing? Superficially 
at least, the answer must surely be “yes.” Imperial conquest and a co-
lonial domination founded on racial differentiation and exclusion is in-
defensible on numerous grounds. Yet to scratch the surface of colonial 
history is to reveal countless ardent imperialists for whom colonialism 
was self-evidently virtuous, morally unimpeachable, even ethically im-
perative. Thus we return to our opening question: “Why?”
 The external factors mentioned above provide answers, but not a 
comprehensive explanation of imperialists’ motivations. To reach that, 
we need to think about the components of their cultural outlook, the 
sources of their attitudes toward such issues as nation, race, ethnicity, 
gender, and religion. In short, we have to look deeper into the coloniz-
ers’ minds. It is the purpose of this book and its companion volume, 
The French Colonial Mind, Volume 2: Violence, Military Encounters, 
and Colonialism, to explore these questions.
 The two linked volumes of The French Colonial Mind originated in 
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a conference held at the University of Exeter’s Institute of Arab and Is-
lamic Studies over a sunny spring weekend in April 2007. Hosted by 
the Centre for the Study of War, State, and Society, the conference was 
generously supported by the Leverhulme Trust and the University of Ex-
eter’s Department of History. It is a pleasure to acknowledge their sup-
port here. The two anonymous readers who each read the manuscripts 
for each volume did a wonderful job in pointing us to additional lines of 
enquiry. Robert Aldrich helped clarify the conference’s organizing theme, 
and his outstanding work over many years was a key inspiration for it. 
Ruth Ginio also kindly read my introductions to both volumes and, as 
usual, made incisive suggestions about how to improve them. As editor, 
I would also like to thank Claire Keyte and Andrew Thorpe at Exeter 
and Heather Lundine, Bridget Barry, Joeth Zucco, and Jim Le Sueur at 
the University of Nebraska Press for their invaluable help in bringing 
the project to fruition. Editing is sometimes regarded as a rather thank-
less task. That has certainly not been the case for me, for which I thank 
all of the contributors to The French Colonial Mind, as well as our out-
standing copyeditor, Jane Curran. Producing the volumes has been a 
real pleasure and a rich source of insight into the many facets of French 
colonialism. I’ve learned a lot and enjoyed myself doing so. I hope that 
readers will derive something similar from the chapters that follow.
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Introduction
Mapping the French Colonial Mind
martin thomas
What is the French colonial mind? The proposition that there existed 
a collective conscious, or unconscious, thought process — a universal 
mind of French colonialism — that influenced, determined, or otherwise 
affected key decisions in the colonial encounter may appear ambitious to 
the credulous, ludicrous to the skeptic. There were, of course, countless 
supporters of imperialism, thousands of empire administrators, seem-
ingly endless colonial minds. Yet, whether treated in the singular or 
the plural, investigating the mind — or minds — of colonialism promises 
valuable results. Why?
Historians typically search for links between extraneous factors and 
personal motivations in seeking to explain why individuals, groups, 
institutions, or governments acted in particular ways. Central to this is 
the mental universe — the outlook or worldview — of those involved in 
the events or decisions analyzed. The challenge facing scholars of empire 
is to study the commonalities among colonial minds while acknowledg-
ing the dangers of oversimplification. Attitudinal formation and the 
derivation of shared ideas are critical, often revealing more subtleties 
than stereotypes. As Susan Bayly has argued in relation to Paul Mus, 
one of France’s most reflective and influential thinkers on the cultures of 
the Indochinese peninsula, careful interrogation of the idea of “colonial 
minds” challenges the generic applicability of the stock terminology 
familiar to scholars of colonial history, from “civilizing mission” to 
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“Orientalism” and notions of the Other.1 Even in the case of the other 
turn-of-the-century Francophone empire, King Leopold’s Congo Free 
State, the once widely accepted notion that the early paths of Belgian 
imperialism were reducible to the beliefs and desires of a single royal 
mind has now been exploded. Confronted with diverse peoples and 
practices, Belgium’s imperialists, like their French cousins, “had multiple 
‘others’ against which to define [their] identity.”2 Their responses were 
as multifaceted as the cultures they encountered. As in the Belgian case, 
so in the French, the suggestion that the connections between mental 
processes and identity formation could be precisely mapped or, more 
ambitious still, reduced to singular generic characteristics, might also 
raise scholarly eyebrows. Yet, strip these ideas down to their essentials, 
to their individual components, and the colonial mind quickly becomes 
an essential and familiar analytical tool. For colonial mind-sets, individ-
ual or collective, were products of their cultural environment and their 
historical moment. Seen in this light, study of the colonial mind — or 
minds — builds on the body of work regarding cultures of empire, which 
ranks among the fastest growing and the most dynamic in the field of 
colonial history.3
It has, for instance, become almost inconceivable that a general his-
tory of empire and its rulers could be written without consideration of 
social mores and cultural practices, of habit, tradition, and custom, as 
well as politics and economics.4 Colonial minds made possible what 
Ann Stoler has termed the “imperial formations” on which the legal, 
institutional, and cultural bases of colonial discrimination were built. 
The legitimization of discrimination and coercive extraction derived 
from commonplace ideas among imperialists of the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries who, as Stoler puts it, justified “imperial guardian-
ship, trusteeships, delayed autonomy, temporary intervention, condi-
tional tutelage, military takeover in the name of humanitarian works, 
violent intervention in the name of human rights, and security measures 
in the name of peace.”5 Imperial formations, the product of shared 
presumptions and cultural norms, determined the forms of knowledge 
production regarding colonial societies within European imperial states.6 
As a result these formations provided the building blocks with which to 
construct what Roland Barthes termed “the myth of French imperiality.” 
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This rhetoric of order from chaos, of cultural elevation within the fabric 
of “greater France,” achieved widespread currency among politicians, 
intellectuals, and the wider public in twentieth-century France.7 The 
underlying anxieties and unspoken fears of colonial officials only too 
aware of the actual fragility of their colonial presence, were rarely ar-
ticulated in bureaucratic reports and government correspondence. And 
yet, as Stoler has again shown, such insecurity was deeply embedded in 
the very processes of reportage, surveillance, and segregation that helped 
make colonial rule inherently exclusionary and repressive. Investigating 
colonial attitudes helps us decode the bombast so common in official co-
lonial documentation.8 They reveal the gaps between the self-assurance 
with which empire was represented as a force for good on paper and 
the persistent doubts and fears among officials daily confronted with a 
majority population unremittingly hostile or, at best, indifferent to their 
claims of imperial improvement.
The few individuals, largely at the extreme left of the political spec-
trum or among the literary and artistic avant-garde, who opposed such 
representations of empire resorted to shock tactics in their efforts to 
persuade French opinion that colonialism was anything but benevolent.9 
Initially, at least, few took notice. Far more influential were the changing 
patterns of academic engagement with empire, which lent intellectual 
weight to the belief that France pursued a higher imperial purpose than 
mere strategic, economic, or political advantage. The role of such empire- 
oriented disciplines as social anthropology, psychology, and ethnography 
is now placed squarely alongside the perhaps better-known academic 
specialties — classical history, geography, and Darwinian biology — as 
determinants of European imperialist credos.10 Understandings of the 
physical challenges of living and working in arid, tropical, or otherwise 
forbidding colonial climates were shaped by the belief, increasingly preva-
lent in France and Britain from the mid-nineteenth century, that success-
ful colonization demanded mastery of the science of acclimatization. 
Focused primarily on the exploitation of unfamiliar flora and fauna and 
on conquering the physiological problems, diseases, and other maladies 
encountered by Europeans in the colonial world, an underlying assump-
tion behind acclimatization’s scientific precepts was that Western science 
could tame the colonial environment, harnessing it to European ends.11
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Yet, while such scientific colonialism emboldened French colonizers to 
persist in the face of physical adversity, it was widely accepted that the 
unfamiliarity and daily hardships of life in the colonies could destabilize 
the European mind. Empire was dangerous, not just physically but also 
psychologically. Fears were stoked in the realms of the imagination, 
fueled by both penny-press scaremongering and academic treatises pro-
duced on both sides of the English Channel in which a strong tendency 
developed, particularly evident in the medical context, to “sensational-
ize” the pathological threats inherent to Africa especially. Prolonged 
exposure to life in the colonies could wreck the mind as much as the 
body, producing that quintessentially colonial malady, “tropical neur-
asthenia.”12 Aside from the menace of disease and mental breakdown, 
as one of our contributors, Emmanuelle Sibeud, has argued elsewhere, 
the social dangers that colonies and empire service presented were very 
much constructed by the colonizers. The colonial officials, doctors, 
missionaries, and other quasi-professional ethnographers who tried to 
codify the cultures with which they came into contact are now rightly 
seen not merely as the observers of colonial society but also as its cre-
ators.13 Yet colonialism was a complex process, often dependent as much 
on collaboration as on conquest. The legal codes, customary practices, 
and economic transactions it generated rested on cultural borrowing. 
Only through the co-option of traditional elites and the compliance of 
thousands of local clerks, translators, and other adjuncts did colonial 
“administration” become possible at all.14 A sustained colonial presence 
rested more on hybridity — cultural and administrative — than ruling of-
ficials cared to admit. Little wonder then that nineteenth-century racial 
theorists, Gustave Le Bon and Arthur Gobineau prominent among them, 
depicted colonial expansion and the resultant intercultural contacts not 
just as transformative but also as corruptive of the innate superiority 
of the French.15
If Le Bon and Gobineau represented one, particularly ugly, extreme 
of French reflections on colonialism, the administrators, soldiers, art-
ists, and academics who viewed empire in more positive terms were 
no less prone to misconception. Whether anthropological, sociological, 
or ethnographic, their observations were necessarily artificial.16 Their 
attempts to make sense of the unfamiliar drew on preexisting ideas, 
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often on comparisons with other, foreign examples of phenomena that 
appeared in some way similar to what now confronted them. All were 
exterior points of reference, a reminder that colonial minds, like any 
others, came laden with presumptions. Moreover, those being observed 
were not just abstract “subjects” of enquiry but living subjects of colo-
nial rule.17 How, then, could they be considered dispassionately on their 
own terms? All this is to suggest that concepts of modernity and cultural 
authenticity, of state formation and capitalist economic organization in 
dependent territories, each of them central to our understanding of what 
colonialism involved, require prior consideration of the intellectual and 
attitudinal basis of European imperialism. As historian Frederick Coo-
per has recently observed in the context of French imperialist opinion 
after World War II, to comprehend colonialism, one must address how 
European imperial nations began “thinking like an empire.”18 Colonial 
minds, French or otherwise, are now integral to the study of empires, 
nations, and “natives.”19
Identifiable commonalities of outlook — the product of education, 
career background, or lived experience — help us to grasp why those in 
positions of colonial power acted as they did, whether as governors, as 
economic overseers, as missionaries, or, conversely, as critics of empire. 
Certain aspects of imperialist thinking will always be integral to such 
analysis. Examples include attitudes toward an imperial “mission civil-
isatrice” or a “white man’s burden,” the changing philosophical and 
ideological justifications advanced for colonial rule, the borrowing of 
administrative practice and juridical form from other colonial environs 
or from other imperial rivals, and the intellectualization of race theory.20 
As Robert Nye has pointed out, racist ideas, anxiety about ethnic mix-
ing, and dire eugenicist predictions of societal degeneration were not 
confined to the extremist margins of European intellectual thought in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Quite the reverse: such 
ideas featured in a whole raft of scientific, medical, and political writing, 
gradually transferring into the mainstream current of ideas in France 
and elsewhere.21
Nowhere was this more apparent than in the minutiae of colonial 
codes of practice, whether administrative or commercial, military or le-
gal. As Emmanuelle Saada has argued, just as colonial law made French 
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prestige an inviolable concept, so it provided new legal frameworks 
to help police racial boundaries. Such restrictions cut both ways: on 
the one hand, sleights on the honor of colonial officials were a serious 
criminal offense; on the other, French officials were increasingly expected 
to exercise sexual self-restraint to conserve their “dignity” as members 
of the ruling elite.22 Parallels might be drawn here with their brethren 
in the business community, although European traders and managers 
rarely faced the same level of sanction for “misconduct” toward their 
contacts and employees.23 If the sexual preoccupations of certain fonc-
tionnaires are now well known, other recesses of the colonial mind re-
main less explored. Beneath the horizon of landmark decisions of policy 
and principle the professional, social, and familial milieus inhabited by 
colonial officials, soldiers, educators, religious orders, or settlers also 
molded responses to the workaday challenges of colonial life, whether 
at the level of high policy or at that of personal interaction with indig-
enous peoples.24 Understood as the study of attitudes, presumptions, and 
expectations, investigating the colonial mind thus becomes something 
achievable and useful: an attempt to unpick the constituent parts of 
imperialist (and to a degree anti-imperialist) thought and daily practice.
So is this really a collection of essays about colonial mentalities? 
Building on the Annales School’s approach to histories of the everyday, 
historians of mentalities have tried to codify the formative influences of 
social customs, religious observance, education, the use of language, and 
other behavioral norms in configuring habits of mind. Theirs is a view 
of history that considers cultural practice one of the key determinants of 
social action. What people do reflects how they have been conditioned 
to think, whether at an intellectual or an emotive level, and this pro-
cess is in turn driven by identifiable influences such as those referred to 
above. Cultural outlooks, or mentalities, imperceptibly formed over the 
long term, are thus judged to have a greater bearing on human action 
than the more episodic and transient political events that have typically 
predominated in historical enquiry.25
Does it follow that a study of colonial minds must take mentalities 
and the antipolitical history leanings of the Annales as its starting point? 
Not necessarily. Several of the chapters in both this volume and its 
partner, Violence, Military Encounters, and Colonialism, combine ap-
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preciation for socioeconomic change and formative cultural influences 
with abiding concern for the political “event history” disparaged by the 
Annales School. If anything, the essays in both volumes demonstrate the 
interactions between the two, between patterns of behavior and indi-
vidual agency within the events described.26 Taking a cue from interna-
tional history’s obsession with the mutually reinforcing presumptions of 
bureaucratic elites, several contributors here look beyond the politicians 
and colonial governors supposedly at the apex of French imperial rule to 
consider the derivation of their ideas and policy choices. The “unspoken 
assumptions” of colonial actors are every bit as important as those of 
the high political actors that James Joll examined so carefully in tracing 
the attitudes of mind — the “worldview” — that drove them into taking 
fateful decisions for war in 1914.27
Mary Lewis called recently for historians of empire to look beyond 
the binary oppositions of metropole and colony, colonizer and colonized, 
to recognize the connections between internal societal dynamics and 
wider international rivalries. It is a welcome rallying cry that several 
of the chapters in this and its partner volume take up, acknowledging 
that French colonial attitudes and practices were neither entirely forged 
in French-ruled territory nor solely with French geopolitical interests 
in mind.28 Put differently, as Lewis herself has demonstrated, the local 
and the international were always linked. French colonial bureaucrats, 
wherever they were posted, usually acted in ways that were recognizably 
French, but that often displayed other inflections — perhaps born of their 
earlier career paths in different countries, perhaps derived from rulings, 
treaties, or other limitations imposed by international organizations such 
as the League of Nations. Equally, colonial subjects were just as likely 
to respond to the colonial presence in ways that mirrored their own 
experiences of the foreign. These experiences were as many as they were 
varied but include such dislocating factors as intermarriage, slaving, itin-
erant trading, seasonal movements to different pasturage, and economic 
migration. The colonial world, in other words, was in some ways more 
cosmopolitan than some depictions of predominantly sedentary peasant 
societies allow. Rulers and ruled were, moreover, aware of the disrup-
tive potential of rival imperial powers, whose presence across a nearby 
frontier or, closer to home, within the consulates, missions, and com-
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mercial premises of the colony posed discrete challenges to untrammeled 
French domination.29 Whether at the international level of competition 
between states or at the transnational level of economic, cultural, and 
political ties between communities across imperial boundaries, colonial 
rule could never shut out extraneous influences. Indeed, as Frederick 
Cooper and Jane Burbank have convincingly demonstrated, one of the 
things that made empires such durable political units was their capacity 
to accommodate diverse peoples, traditions, and practices.30 Foreign 
experiences, foreign presences: both affected colonial minds.
If not uniquely French in its derivation, colonialist thinking was, first 
and foremost, elitist in its most fundamental presumption that hierarchy 
and the uneven distribution of power were both politically essential 
and ethically defensible. While French colonial minds provide our focus 
here, the contributors accept that these elite figures and the decisions 
they reached were subject to multiple influences, domestic, colonial, and 
foreign. The goal then is to connect cultural assumptions with political 
outcomes, the origins of prevalent colonialist ideas with the practical 
consequences of such thinking.
Another consideration comes into play here. Perhaps, as with inter-
national systems, so with colonial empires; political actors, whether 
backroom officials or leading politicians, do not begin from the propo-
sition that they can bend the system/empire to their will but start from 
a recognition that the system/empire sets narrow limits to what could 
realistically be achieved.31 And constraints on action could be financial, 
economic, or technological rather than narrowly political or military. As 
this implies, ruling empire was not simply a matter of bilateral relations 
between metropolitan center and colonial periphery. Several contribu-
tors in both of the Colonial Mind volumes have more to say about the 
transnational, about substate interactions across political (or colonial) 
frontiers than the high politics of French colonial policy. Theirs is a view 
of empire in which rigid divides between mother country and colony, 
between individual colonies, or between governors and governed cannot 
be sustained. The model of a honeycomb recently proposed by Patricia 
Clavin to help define transnational relationships is useful here. Bounded 
and interlinked, but with discrete spaces in which particular activities 
were performed, the honeycomb view of transnational imperial relations 
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has much to commend it.32 Yet at the risk of stretching a point, just as in 
a beehive, so within an empire, the colony is ultimately bound together 
by service to a single authority. As other contributors in this volume 
make plain, studying the queen bees can be rewarding. High-policy 
initiatives sometimes provided the clearest — and most significant — evi-
dence of the material impact of attitudes and presumptions. Whether 
investigating those in high office or those working on the peripheries of 
empire, colonial minds, it seems, are not easily confined within any of 
history’s subdisciplinary boundaries.
Set in the context of the French colonial empire, this analysis of intel-
lectual formation inevitably engages with debates about the nature and 
purpose of empire, about the real and the imaginary in French colo-
nialism. Some of these arguments — regarding the relationship between 
republicanism and imperialism, about the place of Christian religion in 
colonial settings, about the social consequences of economic develop-
ment — are of long standing. All were central to colonial policies and ac-
tions from at least the early nineteenth century onward. Their centrality 
to the study of colonial history, rightly, persists.33 Other debates — about 
the social construction of ethnic difference, about the exploitative as-
pects of colonial gender relations, about the forms of violence (physical, 
psychological, cultural) inherent to colonial domination, about memo-
ries of empire and the commemoration or memorialization of decisive 
colonial events — are more contemporary, demarcating and sometimes 
dividing scholars of the “new imperial history.”34
To be sure, thinking about what put the “colonial” into French minds 
cannot alone provide a comprehensive understanding of empire. The very 
term “colonial minds” suggests an analytical preoccupation with the deri-
vations of attitude and the connections between underlying assumptions 
and colonial actions among the insiders within various imperial projects, 
whether official, military, corporate, or cultural. Such a precise focus has 
potential pitfalls. Perhaps the most obvious is, almost by definition, less 
engagement with the minds of colonial subjects than with the rulers of 
empire. But maybe such rigid distinctions are misleading anyway. Con-
sider, for a moment, an example from another empire — the British. In 
1960, three years before Uganda’s independence from Britain, Murray 
Carlin, an instructor at Makerere College, wrote the following:
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What we are practising at Makerere, day in and day out, . . . is the 
subversion . . . of the African mind; the breaking down of mental 
tissues; their reconstruction in the Western mode; the reordering 
of thoughts, feelings, habits, responses, of every aspect of the mind 
and personality. This is what we are doing, and cannot avoid do-
ing — that is the core of our activity.35
At the time, Makerere College was the sole establishment of higher edu-
cation in British-ruled East Africa. The implication in Carlin’s words that 
the capacity of Makerere staff to reorder African minds was a one-way 
process was hardly remarkable. Yet here as elsewhere, it was not just 
the colonized whose outlook was transformed by colonial encounters. 
Those theoretically charged with molding or monitoring African opinion 
were profoundly influenced by the subjects of their gaze.36
As in the British Empire, so in the French, colonizers’ ways of think-
ing were fluid, subject to change in response to colonial experience. 
But what of those with little direct exposure to life in the colonies? 
Numerous French ministers, senior officials, influential business figures, 
soldiers, or intellectuals had important things to say about empire even 
if their personal encounters with it were limited. Theirs could still be 
“colonial minds,” colonialist in outlook because of the apparent ease 
with which they dismissed the opinions of dependent peoples. Except for 
those moments of crisis when insurrection threatened the colonial state, 
there was, for example, little appreciation among leading metropolitan 
policymakers of the “everyday forms of resistance” — the go-slows, non-
compliance, verbal opposition, and tax avoidance, among numerous 
other things — by which peasant agriculturalists or industrial workers 
registered their hostility to colonial rule in a middle ground between 
outright rebellion and functional acquiescence.37
Awareness that numerous colonial minds condemned the overwhelm-
ing majority of unrepresented Africans, Asians, and others to silence, to 
bear mute witness as mere pawns in a grand imperial design, is therefore 
critical to any reading of colonialist attitudes, presumptions, or preju-
dice. And as Greg Mann has warned us, to forget this one-sidedness 
is to risk reproducing the very colonialist presumptions about African 
practices that the analysis of colonial minds should expose.38 Another 
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potential limitation of any work centered on the study of individuals 
and the roots of their ideas is that the impersonal, the structural forces 
driving processes of colonial change may also be overlooked. Attaching 
greater weight to plans, projects, and the origins of imperialist thinking 
risks leaving in the shadows long-term social change, economic transfor-
mation, international pressures, and other “macro” factors that perhaps 
played as great a role in making empire what it was. Perhaps — but 
as many of the essays collected here indicate, it need not be this way. 
Studying the ideas of French imperialists does not suggest that cultural 
diffusion — the spread of ideas and normative standards — was purely 
a one-way process. Looking at the French side of the colonial equation 
and taking individual agency seriously in doing so does not imply disre-
gard for dependent peoples. Nor does it indicate a rejection of structural 
approaches to social change, political economy, or the impact of the 
prevailing international system of the day. To take but one example, it 
is surely impossible to understand French concerns about the productiv-
ity, the cost, and the insurrectionary potential of workers on the rubber 
plantations of southern Vietnam without appreciating the underlying 
economic processes that led to their proletarianization.39 In this case, 
the cultural meets the political at a fundamental level.
Investigations of the cultures that produced colonial minds may 
complement structural approaches, not supplant them. Moreover, as 
Joachim Görlich has noted in the context of recent ethnographic analy-
ses of colonial Oceania:
These studies concentrate mainly on the cultural practices of colo-
nized groups. The colonial authorities are frequently represented as 
undifferentiated, as a homogeneous, hegemonic power block, and 
characterized only as instigators of transformations. However, this 
perception is too one-sided and does not do justice to the complex-
ity and dynamism of the colonial encounter.40
Görlich is surely right. Just as the colonized defy simple categoriza-
tion, so colonial minds were never entirely monolithic, nor did they 
come to colonial situations or economic relationships with ideas fully 
formed. To borrow Andrew Zimmerman’s telling Bourdieu-like phrase 
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in relation to colonial anthropologists, “the field constructs the anthro-
pologist” as much as the anthropologist constructs his or her field.41 Put 
differently, ethnographic knowledge, much like other forms of knowl-
edge about colonial societies, combined presumption and experience, 
subjective expectations and real encounters.42 Broadly speaking, such 
is the finding of George Trumball, whose incisive analysis of French 
ethnographers at work in Algeria after 1871 pinpoints the limitations 
of such encounters:
Defined through relations of participant-observation enmeshed in 
unequal power relations, colonial ethnographies trace the histories, 
above all, of interactions. The behaviors and beliefs of many Alge-
rians remained occluded, outside of the purview of ethnographers. 
Hence, colonial ethnographies, like all administrative archives, per-
haps overemphasize zones of contact and interaction.43
Nor were such interactions confined to academic fieldworkers observ-
ing colonial societies. Officials and settlers were also marked by their 
colonial surroundings, by the political situations they confronted. They 
were subject to conflicting ideas and emotions about what they saw or 
what they did.
Moreover, imperial decision makers, like any other individuals, were 
also affected by social relations within the particular professional mi-
lieus in which they operated. Elites have their own internal hierarchies, 
whether within government, within the armed forces, or within religious 
orders and educational organizations. Pause for a moment to think 
about the apex of French colonial hierarchy: the Ministry of Colonies. 
How did the permanent staff of that ministry relate to other, more senior 
departments of government with far larger budgets and more influential 
personnel, and how did this change over time? Without a formal ranking 
of ministries or a binding system of British-style “collective responsibil-
ity” by which it was expected that all ministers should support govern-
ment decisions, how was consensus reached — and by whom — about the 
direction of colonial policy? If there was no common agreement at all, 
then which individuals or groups became the final arbiters of state — and 
colonial-state decision making? Sometimes these decisions did not stem 
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from elected representatives, but from within state bureaucracy or from 
elite lobby groups collectively described as the “Parti Colonial.” Some-
times colonial governments habitually defied central authority in Paris. 
What clearer evidence of dissentient colonial minds could there be than 
the notorious, disastrous insubordination of the so-called Saigon clique 
of senior officials and military officers grouped around High Commis-
sioner Georges Thierry d’Argenlieu that sped headlong into war with 
the Vietminh in 1946 in open defiance of their nominal political masters 
in Paris.44
Another question we have to ask is thus how politicians related to 
permanent officials whose specialist expertise could be both intimidating 
and excluding? And beyond the walls of government, how did busi-
ness elites interact with bankers and major overseas investors? How 
significant was the common ground between these commercial figures 
in shaping ideas about empire, particularly within the highly sectarian 
and yet oddly cohesive interest groups of the Parti Colonial?45 Finally, 
beyond the boundaries of elite interest, was there room for the general 
public either in France or in the colonies to make their collective pres-
ence felt in the mental worlds of the powerful? If so, are we talking, 
at least before 1945, about the mobilization of predominantly male, 
predominantly bourgeois opinion, or about something more intangible: 
French society and what it would, or would not, tolerate being done 
overseas in its name, but without its express consent?
Most colonial encounters between Europeans and local populations 
were, of course, ostensibly remote from state action. These, too, could 
reverberate beyond those immediately involved, influencing wider at-
titudes to empire and the purposes it served. For increasing numbers 
of well-to-do French families of the early twentieth century, the empire 
was not only a source of national pride but also an exotic tourist play-
ground, a tapestry of colorful places to visit and different cultures to 
“sample.” For the less affluent, the heroic, the exotic, and the titillat-
ing were recurrent features of the empire-themed films that pervaded 
French cinema from the early 1920s to the last days of decolonization. 
In these recreational realms, too, colonial minds were at work. To take 
one telling example, the colonial authorities employed leading illusion-
ist Jean-Eugène Robert-Houdin in the 1850s to tour Algeria. Beguiling 
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local notables with mesmerizing tricks, Robert-Houdin was also em-
ployed to demonstrate the chicanery of sufi marabouts whose claims to 
mystical powers were thrown into question by the magician’s sleight of 
hand. Here were colonial minds at work. The presumption that Algeri-
ans were peculiarly susceptible to supposedly supernatural, miraculous 
sights meshed with the official determination to prove the superiority of 
French rationality and the hollowness of Muslim alternatives by playing 
with the magician’s art.46 Deeply rooted — and deeply flawed — cultural 
presumptions rendered such bizarre methods normal. The use of Robert-
Houdin pointed to what would become a common pattern. Whether in 
the production of official guidebooks that depicted colonial subjects and 
imperialist achievements in particular ways, in the exploitation of com-
mercial opportunities to generate new sources of revenue from tourist 
encounters between French visitors and colonial populations, or in the 
distinct racial and economic taxonomies that differentiated the French 
from their fictionalized colonial subjects on the cinema screen, colonial 
subjects were rendered explicable to imperialist minds through two-
dimensional stereotypes.47 And these stereotypes were crudest of all in 
the sphere of popular leisure. These changing forms of recreation and 
popular “consumption” of imperialist ideas also influenced — and were 
influenced by — the promotion of empire in mainland France, something 
that required the engagement of French metropolitan minds with the 
colonial project.48 
A final element to consider here is the national aspect of colonial 
minds. That changing forms of popular imperialism were connected 
with the development of imperialist attitudes may seem self-evident, 
but were the forms or the processes involved uniquely French? As Mat-
thew Stanard has recently observed, such were the commonalities in 
attitude toward colonial peoples, dreams of colonial riches, and impe-
rial obligation to “civilize” colonized groups across nineteenth- and 
early twentieth-century Europe that it is perhaps impossible to discern 
uniquely national imperialisms. These were viral ideas, fast spreading 
and seemingly irresistible; their original source was difficult to trace. 
In this sense the French colonial minds studied in this volume may of-
fer scholars some means to hold a mirror to their equivalents in other 
European imperial states.49
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These multifarious and unquantifiable composite elements of atti-
tude formation make our task complicated enough, but there is an-
other level of analysis entirely. Perhaps the minds of political leaders 
were largely made up before they faced the countervailing pressures of 
ministerial responsibility, party interest, financial market pressure, or 
voter verdicts. Should we see the agglomeration of competing external 
demands on decision makers as secondary to the preexistent attitudes 
of mind with which they approached colonial issues? A lofty politician 
or colonial governor, even a lowly police officer or missionary educator, 
might be subject to local political pressure to act in certain ways, but 
more influential still might be their underlying outlook in regard to the 
actions they were expected to take. To use the most obvious example, 
few questioned the notion that in colonial societies white Europeans 
and nonwhite indigenous populations would — and should — be treated 
differently. Such attitudes were often the product of ingrained prejudices 
and racial assumptions that owed more to family background, cultural 
milieus, educational experience, religious dogma, contemporary writ-
ings, and — conversely — to ignorance of any alternative way of thinking, 
than to specific instructions from higher authorities that could be located 
in time and place. Long years of reinforcement of such assumptions 
through social, familial, and professional contact with like-minded indi-
viduals carried greater weight than the more sporadic, unorthodox sug-
gestions of a minority that such attitudes might, perhaps, be misguided. 
Thus we return to the importance of studying colonial minds to help us 
unravel the ways in which material alternatives were understood and 
approached. Actions, choices, and decisions rooted in culturally derived 
attitudes and practices had lasting political consequences.
These consequences, moreover, lasted beyond the formal end of co-
lonial rule and in some ways endure still. Consider for a moment the 
recent struggles between politicians, media commentators, and academ-
ics over the ways in which the French colonial past should or should 
not be represented in French schools.50 Or witness the contretemps 
between former French president Jacques Chirac and his Senegalese 
counterpart Abdoulaye Wade over the past contributions and present-
day pension rights of West African former servicemen of the French 
colonial army.51 Or simply look no further than the paternalist language 
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still commonplace in French official pronouncements about former 
dependencies, of which French president Nicolas Sarkozy’s otherwise 
conciliatory speech to Senegalese students at the University of Dakar 
on 27 July 2007 was but one among many.52 All of these examples 
remind us that studying colonial minds is not just history, but a matter 
of current affairs.
This collection of essays and its partner volume on colonial violence take 
as their starting point the proposition that thought precedes action, its 
multiple forms notwithstanding. In certain circumstances — for instance, 
prior to the launch of a crucial policy initiative or the establishment of a 
trading company, a mission school, or a hospital — this reflective process 
could run to months and years, its twists and turns traceable in the ar-
chival record. In other cases — from decisions about where to settle, with 
whom to socialize, and how to behave in the company of different eth-
nic groups or in different communal settings — the “thought” involved 
requires more delicate unpicking. These were decisions more likely to 
be recorded in personal correspondence, in diaries, or in intimate con-
versation; often they were not recorded at all. Yet the importance of 
such decision making is hard to dispute. Collectively, these patterns of 
social behavior among the French communities of empire — the settlers, 
officials, and others who asserted their pride of place within colonial 
society — molded the ways in which empire developed politically, eco-
nomically, and culturally.
Aside from this concern with the connections between thoughts and 
patterns of behavior, the chapters that follow suggest that thought is, to 
varying degrees, conditioned by habits of mind. Such habits were — and 
are — strongly affected by familial upbringing, educational background, 
or the social or professional networks in the context of which the actions 
discussed took place. What unites them is their concentration on what 
lay behind the decisions or the actions investigated, what made them 
possible, indeed probable, and, in some cases, even inevitable. Some 
of the events discussed are well known, others far less so. But in their 
focus on the derivation of ideas and the often unspoken assumptions of 
colonial elites, the essays cast new light on themes familiar to scholars 
of colonialism in general, and French colonialism in particular.
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Chapter Content: Volume 1
In the opening chapter of volume 1 Patricia Lorcin reflects on the in-
terpretive slants that might be applied to the term “colonial mind” or 
its collective equivalent, “colonial minds.” She reviews the themes that 
emerge strongly across the two volumes, picking out points of conver-
gence and divergence, as well as other aspects of imperialist attitude 
formation that might be further explored. Her chapter is also the prelude 
to the four essays in the first section of volume 1, all of which examine 
various facets of “Colonial Encounters and Imaginings of Empire.” 
Picking up from Patricia Lorcin, in her contribution Emmanuelle 
Sibeud revisits the issue central to the entire volume: was there ever a 
definitive French colonial mind? Her questioning goes further. If, indeed, 
there was an identifiable, collective “colonial mind,” how far were in-
tellectuals a part of it? How far, indeed, did they shape it? She answers 
these questions by focusing on an individual career, that of Félicien Chal-
laye. Born in 1875, Challaye came to public attention after returning 
from Savorgnan de Brazza’s mission to the French Congo. His ferocious 
criticism of colonial abuses in Central Africa and the sensational impact 
of his writings give the lie to a kind of “absent-minded” imperialism in 
the early Third Republic, suggesting that there was no lack of enthusi-
asm for empire, no lack of contested debate over its human costs, among 
the country’s political and intellectual elite. Challaye was certainly no 
thoughtless imperialist inured to the cruelties of colonial rule. Yet he ac-
cepted the principle, even the inevitability, of colonial expansion, seeing 
it as a process that could not be resisted, only controlled. His attitude to 
empire was conditioned by the need, as he saw it, to regulate relations 
between exploiters and exploited. This led him to place empires and 
individual colonies in a hierarchy covering the spectrum from good to 
bad colonial governance. These ideas would become central to liberal 
and eventually Socialist thinking about the possibilities of “humanist” 
imperialism, marking him out as an intellectual architect of the French 
imperial mind.53
Ruth Ginio explores the imagination of colonial minds run wild in 
her examination of French colonial perceptions of African witchcraft.54 
She does so by focusing on allegations of ritual murder and consequent 
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criminal trials in French West African criminal courts during the 1920s 
and 1930s. As she points out, colonial obsession with African witchcraft 
revealed far more about French fears and stereotypes than about the 
African societies being observed. Witchcraft, and especially what were 
defined as “witchcraft-related crimes,” elicited a stream of inquiries, 
some official, others quasi-scholastic, which brought administrators and 
academics together as amateur ethnographers.
Ginio’s chapter considers two instances of this process at work. It 
focuses first on Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1857–1938), a French philosopher 
who wrote extensively on what he defined as the “primitive mind,” 
and second on Marcel Prouteaux, a future governor whose interwar 
career began as a serving commandant de cercle in Côte d’Ivoire. Prou-
teaux mounted the largest official investigation hitherto attempted of 
witches’ secret societies within his territory. It emerges that these two 
men thought very differently about African religion, African social or-
ganization, and African minds. Examining their writings comparatively, 
Ginio reduces their opposing viewpoints to two core differences: the 
capacity of Africans to think and act according to French precepts of 
logic, and the utility of prosecuting witchcraft cases in enhancing colo-
nial state control. Where Lévy-Bruhl accepted the former and dismissed 
the latter, Prouteaux did the reverse. His more apocalyptic vision of West 
African witchcraft as a twentieth-century echo of Europe’s premodern 
witch crazes proved the more influential — and damaging — as more al-
leged cases of ritual murder went through the colonial legal system.55
John Strachan’s essay revisits the place of empire, in this case, Algeria, 
in the intellectual formation — the colonial minds — of two of France’s 
most preeminent historians of the twentieth century: Fernand Braudel 
and Charles-André Julien.56 Braudel spent most of the 1920s and early 
1930s in the colony, taking teaching posts at lycées in Algiers and Con-
stantine to help fund the completion of his doctoral research.57 Julien’s 
family had moved to Algeria from Caen in 1906, and their liberal, Drey-
fusard leanings helped define his critical outlook toward the iniquities of 
colonialism that he saw around him. If Julien was always the academic 
heretic, drawing the hostile attention of the security services for his per-
sistent attacks on colonial government, Braudel was slower to appreciate 
the social injustices of colonial rule. He did, however, take issue with the 
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study of history at the University of Algiers, which during the interwar 
years was dominated by an ethnocentric, Latin perspective on the history 
of North Africa and the Mediterranean. In his adoption of the longue 
durée perspective on the history of Mediterranean cultures, Braudel 
marginalized — and thus implicitly criticized — the French colonial pres-
ence, which he identified as but a fleeting moment in historical time.
Focusing on wartime Indochina under Vichy rule, Anne Raffin dem-
onstrates another side to the colonial encounter and its effects on of-
ficial minds. She discusses the place of administrative inspection visits as 
intelligence-gathering exercises in which the potential for a transfer of 
knowledge between governors and governed was all too often missed. 
The papers of Governor-General Admiral Jean Decoux reveal remark-
ably little interaction with Vietnamese, whether members of the indig-
enous elites or not. Indeed, his accounts of inspection tours recount his 
impatience with the subtleties of indigenous cultures and traditions. 
Raffin takes this as her starting point for a broader consideration of 
Vichy’s “official mind” in Indochina. She posits that there was a classic 
administrator “type,” an official class prone to misperception about the 
peoples of Indochina. The recurrence of stereotype and the enduring 
reluctance to accord value to indigenous forms of social organization 
suggest that at certain times and in certain locales such “types” often 
came to prominence. Raffin proves the point by focusing on the relation-
ship between Governor Decoux and his fellow naval officer, Maurice 
Ducoroy, appointed head of the Vichy-style youth organization in Indo-
china. By mobilizing Vietnamese youth into Vichyite organizations and 
attempting to foster a new style colonial patriotism through sport and 
other “character-building” activities, Ducoroy’s policies rapidly back-
fired.58 Far from providing a safe, apolitical outlet for youthful energies 
and so retarding the development of political consciousness among the 
young, mobilization sharpened the very sense of national belonging that 
the colonial authorities were anxious to prevent.
The second section of Volume 1, “Language, Culture, and Communi-
ties of the Colonial Mind,” contains four essays that address the parts 
played by education, media of instruction, and bonds of community in 
forging colonial minds.59 Kenneth J. Orosz’s assessment of conflict and 
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competition between state and missionary educators in the Cameroon 
mandate exposes the bitter disagreements over suitable educational prac-
tice for colonized minds. He begins from the proposition that however 
one chooses to define such a constituency, the language of instruction 
was uniquely influential in transforming those to be educated. He proves 
the point by focusing on the Mandate’s early years, during which an 
intense, sectarian war was fought over language policy between the 
dominant missionary groups in the territory: the Catholic Spiritains and 
their Protestant missionary group rivals. Many of the latter established 
their schools during the preceding German colonial era, although they 
were largely staffed by British and Americans.
The central argument that divided these groups concerned the me-
dium of instruction in primary school teaching. Determined to recast the 
minds of young Camerounais in a French Catholic image, the Spiritains’ 
espousal of French instruction clashed with Protestant mission groups, 
which insisted that progress could be achieved only by teaching in the 
African vernacular languages of Cameroon. In spite of French state 
backing for French language instruction, the Spiritains underwent a fun-
damental change of mind in the mid-1920s, accepting that their spiritual 
and political message was more effectively delivered in vernacular form. 
As Orosz shows, these language wars and their effects, both on mission-
ary minds and on those of the children to pass through mission schools, 
compel us to think about the very basis of colonial implantation, specifi-
cally about how colonial ideas were composed and transmitted.
María del Mar Logroño Narbona’s contribution analyzes neglected, 
but substantial, communities of colonial minds: the thousands of Syrians 
and Lebanese settlers, mainly commercial traders, living across Latin 
America in the interwar years. French acquisition of the Syria and Leba-
non Mandates in 1920 engaged these communities directly. Furthermore, 
the fact that some 20 percent of all Syrians and Lebanese lived outside 
the Levant aroused deep concern in the French security services, stirring 
fears that these emigrants would become focal points for anticolonial 
sedition, nationalist ideas, and hostile propaganda.60 Concentrating on 
Latin America, Logroño charts the efforts of French diplomatic and 
police agencies to monitor these overseas Levantine communities and 
their links with families and acquaintances “back home.” The French 
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thereby sought to control the movement of knowledge between the 
mandates and their emigrant communities as well as the movement of 
people, money, and goods between the two. Logroño’s examination 
of this French preoccupation with emigrant opinion suggests that we 
should conceptualize the Levant mandates in demographic terms — as 
peoples — rather than in merely geographical terms as distinct territorial 
locations.
The Levant mandates are also the focal point for Jennifer Dueck’s 
chapter, which highlights differential state treatment of confessional 
groups in Lebanon, something that helped determine patterns of social 
and political change in the mandate. She analyzes the connections, pro-
fessional and personal, between leading French and Lebanese educators 
and political actors, the cumulative result of which was to reinforce the 
power of the Maronite Patriarchy. Importantly, however, Dueck points 
to growing friction between Jesuit, Catholic, and Maronite religious and 
educational institutions as their minds became fixated on the prospect 
of Lebanese independence in the years immediately preceding World 
War II. Catholic, especially Jesuit, institutions were, above all, anxious 
to conserve the status and privileges of their religious and educational 
institutions whereas the Maronite Patriarchy was more broadly ani-
mated by the consolidation of Maronite dominance within the politi-
cal elite of an independent Lebanese nation state. In her discussion of 
these mounting rivalries and differing political and cultural priorities, 
Dueck argues that French efforts to build consensus — a shared colonial 
mind — between Lebanon’s French Catholic and Maronite hierarchies 
was doomed to failure.61
Algeria is the site for the last essay in this second section. James D. 
Le Sueur echoes the preceding essays in arguing that issues of language 
and identity were both inseparable and paramount in Algeria’s colonial 
and postcolonial politics. Propagating the use of French, imposing strict 
language requirements, and denigrating local languages as inferior or ob-
solete were all weapons used by officials in the centralization of colonial 
power and the marginalization of precolonial cultures. Favoring certain 
languages over others was also integral to the practices of divide and 
rule, not least between Berber and Arabic-speaking populations in North 
Africa.62 Conversely, as Le Sueur points out, for nationalists in numer-
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ous colonial and postcolonial locations an urgent political priority was 
to supplant the inauthentic language of the colonizer — English, French, 
Portuguese, Afrikaans — with the authentic, local indigenous languages 
that had for years been marginalized, even prohibited. Algeria’s Front de 
Libération Nationale considered this task pivotal to the rediscovery of 
the country’s Arabic and Arabo-Islamic civilization. Arabization began 
under Ahmed Ben Bella in 1964 but was pursued with greater intensity 
under Houari Boumediene when a process of what Le Sueur dubs “de-
frenchification” gathered pace.
Matters did not run smoothly. Le Sueur detects a disjuncture between 
the Arabophones who had been trained and educated according to the 
tenets of the Arabization program, but who nonetheless could not secure 
the same level of administrative posts or other employments next to 
those who were fluent French speakers. Le Sueur then turns his attention 
to the colonial authorities in the last days of French Algeria. Ironically, 
they too turned to Arabization from 1959 onward, hoping that by doing 
so they might reconcile Algerians to a continuing French presence. It 
was also hoped that widespread adoption of a distinct Maghreb Arabic, 
as opposed to standard Arabic, would render Algerians immune to the 
attractions of pan-Arabism and Egyptian-style radicalism. These goals 
proved unrealistic. Thwarted by the practical obstacles and political 
barriers to such a program, French-controlled Arabization did not get 
far. It nonetheless tells us much about colonial minds in the final years 
of French Algeria as the pursuit of linguistic and cultural integration 
acquired greater urgency in the face of the apparent radicalization of 
the Arab world.
The five essays in the third and final section of volume 1 discuss what 
might be termed “official minds.”63 Each examines changing forms of 
imperialist thinking among French colonial administrators after 1945. 
Martin Shipway investigates one of the most influential actors in the 
reconfiguration of the French Empire as French Union between 1944 and 
1947.64 His subject, Henri Laurentie, director of political affairs in the 
Ministry for Overseas France, was a key figure in the postwar reconstruc-
tion of empire and the immediate origins of the Franco-Vietnam War. 
Yet, as Shipway indicates, while Laurentie was a central actor in these 
Buy the Book
Mapping the French Colonial Mind
xxxiii
events, he remained strangely detached from them. Apparently an ad-
ministrative insider, Laurentie was more the outsider intellectually — too 
liberal, too radical, and, in some ways, not enough of a “colonial” mind 
to secure acceptance of his ideas. His position was, in this sense, analo-
gous to that of the minister who would build on many of Laurentie’s 
ideas, the veteran Socialist Marius Moutet, who would, in turn, find 
himself marginalized once the scope for radical reform in the Indochina 
Federation diminished as the territory edged closer to war with France in 
1946.65 As Shipway makes clear, Laurentie’s brief ascendancy during the 
late war years came to an abrupt halt even earlier, in September 1945. It 
was then that Laurentie dared to suggest that government reform plans, 
such as the March 1945 colonial declaration that he had helped draw 
up, were unfit for their purpose.
What lay behind this spectacular change of colonial mind? Shipway 
demonstrates that the answer lies in Laurentie’s distinctive administra-
tive background. He was neither a career colonial official with years of 
field service nor a graduate of the administrators’ training college, the 
École Coloniale. As a result, Laurentie’s view of empire was always more 
cosmopolitan and comparative than specialist and local. Laurentie’s case 
was more typical in other ways, however. For one, he exemplified the 
dichotomy between administrative insider and political outsider that 
so often marked out colonial officials. Close to the center — even at the 
center — of power in their own locale, the empire’s senior administra-
tors found it harder to influence elite political opinion in metropolitan 
France. Sometimes, as in Indochina, this impelled them to backstairs 
intrigue.66 In other instances it left officials feeling overlooked and ig-
nored. In this sense, Laurentie offers a model of a certain sort of official: 
high-minded and farsighted certainly, but frustrated by the mundane 
realities of French coalition politics, inter-agency wrangling, and the 
scheming of lesser officials in Saigon. His was a frustrated colonial mind, 
its insights squandered by the political actors and governing officials to 
whom Laurentie reported.
Véronique Dimier’s contribution puts a different perspective on the 
“official mind” of French imperialism by investigating the part played 
by former colonial administrators in the overseas aid agencies of the 
European Community.67 She points out that, while such officials had 
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rarely applied indirect rule in practice while serving in the empire, some 
of them eventually did so while administering European Economic Com-
munity (eec) development aid. As Louis Sicking, another student of 
colonial influences on the eec, has recently pointed out, “France thus 
joined two different communities in 1958: the eec and the Community 
with its overseas territories. There was no question of a divorce yet. In 
the perception of some, this was more a case of bigamy.”68 That France 
was able to sustain this bigamous relationship with the eec and its fast 
decolonizing black African territories was largely thanks to the former 
colonial officials that populated key offices of the eec. As Dimier makes 
plain, it is thus possible to read the work of colonial minds even in the 
founding constitutional documents of European integration and Euro-
pean development aid to Africa. Her analysis ranges from the provisions 
of the Treaty of Rome to those of the Yaoundé Convention and, later 
still, the Lomé Convention of 1975. This date marks the endpoint of 
her analysis, as it was at Lomé that British officials wrested control of 
development aid from their French counterparts.
The picture was much different beforehand, as Dimier demonstrates. 
Initial European economic development provisions were entirely mod-
eled on the French postwar colonial development scheme. Hence the 
recourse to colonial terminology and associationist precepts, styles, and 
practices that continued into the 1960s and even into the 1970s. Aid 
policy was therefore couched in a paternalist language of European 
support for emergent former dependencies. This was not, of course, a 
purely African phenomenon; witness, for example, the continuities in 
“developmentalist” thinking across the European colonial territories 
of Southeast Asia from the 1920s to the 1960s.69 But it was certainly 
in black Africa that the eec presence was strongest. Echoing the work 
of Christophe Bonneuil, Dimier illustrates that European aid to several 
newly independent African countries repackaged a string of state-driven 
development schemes informed by colonial era presumptions about the 
supremacy of western scientific rationalism and the continuing African 
requirement for European guidance.70
In another replication of erstwhile colonial practice, development 
aid administrators toured former colonial territories in order to cement 
relationships with client rulers and politicians. In Dimier’s words, not 
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only was the European Community’s early aid policy colonial in origin, 
but it also was implemented by “colonial administrators at a distance.” 
The result of this domination of administrative offices by colonial minds 
was what Dimier terms a new “sedimentation of empire.”
Where Dimier traces French colonial thinking forward from the im-
mediate postwar period, Tony Chafer’s essay begins by looking back-
ward from the perspective of the early Fourth Republic to colonial 
policymaking in Francophone West Africa immediately before World 
War II. He notes the extent to which pre-1939 precedents remained 
central to the delineation and implementation of post-1945 colonial 
reform. That said, the postwar period brought to the fore a host of 
factors that reconfigured colonial administrative practice. Among the 
most important were the new bureaucratic agencies, both governmental 
and nongovernmental, created to administer economic development, to 
monitor labor conditions, and to supervise political reform. Like Dimier, 
Chafer highlights the significance of the 1946 French colonial develop-
ment program, the fides. Its implementation led to the emergence of a 
whole new raft of colonial bureaucracy. So, too, did the establishment 
of the colonial Labor Inspectorate (Inspection du travail), studied by 
Frederick Cooper.71
These new bureaucracies remolded official attitudes toward long-term 
structural change across French West Africa. For example, whereas be-
fore 1939 the African worker was typically depicted as a transient phe-
nomenon to be tolerated but not encouraged, after 1945 state agencies 
and nongovernmental organizations (ngos) presupposed that increasing 
industrialization and proletarianization were inevitable. But if colonial 
minds were changing, Chafer also argues that colonial policy became 
less coherent as the proliferation of groups with a stake in governmen-
tal decisions, not to mention the emergence of stronger, more cohesive 
nationalist groups, introduced greater complexity to the policymaking 
process. There was, for instance, intense rivalry between the Inspection 
du travail’s universalist ethos, which posited that French and African 
workers should eventually be treated comparably, and the majority of 
colonial government officials who adhered to associationist thinking, 
preferring traditional solutions to local problems. Implicit in this ar-
gument is that the new institutional mechanisms devised after 1945, 
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which were meant to achieve policy coordination, were inadequate to 
the task — that the official mind of French imperialism had broken down 
into fragmentary elements.
Todd Shepard’s essay also connects past precedents to changing con-
ceptualizations of empire. He does so by analyzing political debate in 
Paris and Algiers over the scope and purpose of “integrationism” in 
postwar Algeria.72 As Shepard notes, although formal French adoption 
of the term “integration” is usually traced back to Interior Minister 
François Mitterrand’s January 1955 announcement of French policy in 
North Africa, both the idea and the terminology had longer antecedents. 
In a fascinating discussion, he links integrationist thinking, most fa-
mously and most doggedly espoused by anthropologist-turned-Algerian 
governor Jacques Soustelle, to earlier variants of the policy in mainland 
France, in the United States, and, most notably in Soustelle’s case, in 
Latin America. Central to the integrationists’ argument was the conten-
tion that France did not possess an empire. Rather, it was an empire: 
hence their preference for the term France mondiale, “global France.” 
Shepard’s forensic exploration of the intellectual roots of integrationism, 
and the increasingly tortuous thinking of its proponents as the Algerian 
revolution proceeded, reveals how certain of the brightest colonial minds 
within France’s governing elite struggled to devise viable institutional 
practices and citizenship reforms, the avowed, if unfulfilled, purpose of 
which was a “deracialized imperialism.”
Alexander Keese’s contribution, the final essay of volume 1, moves 
us south of the Sahara once more. He investigates the French colonial 
mind through the prism of elections and electoral procedures in the post-
war years preceding decolonization’s perhaps artificial 1960 endpoint 
in French West Africa. Elections took place with remarkable regularity 
in the final years of colonial rule throughout this vast region, widening 
the circle of African populations able to participate in differing levels of 
territorial representation. The process culminated in 1956–58 as votes 
took place, first over the French enabling law (Loi Cadre), and then 
in referenda on membership of the French “Community” of Franco-
phone African states.73 Superficially at least, this might be construed 
as a triumph of gradualism and democratic inclusion — a vindication 
of reformist colonial minds. Not so. Keese makes plain that the reality 
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of electoral practice was altogether different. As fears of organized na-
tionalist opposition intensified, so the rigging of elections assumed new 
forms. Keese reflects upon what this indicates, taking issue with British 
imperial historian Kenneth Robinson’s identification of a “French style” 
of dealing with “natives” wishing to vote. In analyzing the methods by 
which colonial authorities sought to control the outcome of elections, 
Keese’s judgment is subtler. While he highlights the prevalence of state 
coercion, financial corruption, and manipulation of opinion, he also 
concedes that in certain instances officials were prepared to countenance 
a free vote. His essay demonstrates that detailed study of these colonial 
elections is an excellent vehicle for analysis of the gradual alteration 
of official minds as resistance to decolonization diminished over time. 
With the curtain fast descending on France’s empire in Africa, it is also 
a fitting point to close this first volume of essays on facets of French 
colonial minds at work.
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